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The main problem with our society, are these broken links.  
Everything that ties us together between regions, generations, past 
and present, has been shattered by the Soviet Union, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the successor regime to the Soviet Union.  We 
will only become a healthy society once we have rebuilt those 
connections, somehow.1 
INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE STAGE 
Since the mid-1990s, the Russian Federation (Russia) has been 
engaged in a series of violent struggles within its North Caucasus 
territory.2  While much attention has rightly focused on the Republic 
of Chechnya, the locus of two wars and a protracted counterterrorist 
operation, the nature of the violence has varied across the region in 
the interceding years.3  In the neighboring Republic of Dagestan, 
violence increased after Russia declared an end to the second 
Chechen war.4  Efforts to sustainably stem violence in this restive 
republic have been stymied because Russia has failed to meaningfully 
address a series of critically important contextual factors: Dagestani 
governance, the backdrop of regional violence, and human rights 
violations against the local population.  In short, conflict occurs in 
context, and by failing to connect the dots, Moscow’s policies have 
undermined security in its periphery–Dagestan’s capital, 
Makhachkala, and the hinterlands it governs. 
Charles King notes, “Awe and terror have often been intertwined 
in outsiders’ conceptions of the Caucasus.”5  Indeed, it is terror that 
focused U.S. attention on this oft-overlooked corner of Russia in the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. BEN JUDAH, FRAGILE EMPIRE: HOW RUSSIA FELL IN AND OUT OF LOVE WITH 
VLADIMIR PUTIN 253 (2013) (quoting Filip Dzyadko, characterized as a journalist and 
activist). 
 2. Note that there is also a series of historical conflicts, discussed briefly infra, 
that provide the backdrop for the current situation, including Russia’s Caucasus Wars 
of the seventeenth century and Stalin’s population purges of the 1940s.  For analysis 
of contemporary and historic conflicts, see CHARLES KING, THE GHOST OF FREEDOM 
5 (2008); ANATOL LIEVEN, CHECHNYA—TOMBSTONE OF RUSSIAN POWER (1998); 
ROBERT SCHAEFER, THE INSURGENCY IN CHECHNYA AND THE NORTH CAUCASUS 
(2011); Svante E. Cornell, The War against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya: 
A Case for Distinction, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 167, 169–70 (2003). 
 3. For information on violence levels, see Statistics of Victims, CAUCASIAN 
KNOT (Sept. 12, 2013, 12:19 PM), http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/search?rubric_id=601 
(noting, for example, that seventy-six persons fell to armed conflicts in Northern 
Caucasus in August 2013). 
 4. Id. 
 5. KING, supra note 2, at 5. 
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spring of 2013.6  Anzor and Zubeidat Tsarnaev, the parents of 
Dzhokar and Tamarlan, the two young men accused of carrying out 
the Boston Marathon bombing in April of 2013, live in Makhachkala.7  
News articles after the attack were peppered with questions about 
whether the brothers Tsarnaev were radicalized in Dagestan.8  A 
report scheduled for release in the summer of 2013 asks whether the 
violence of the region has come to the United States, in essence from 
the Caucasus to Copley.9  Additionally, the 2014 Winter Olympics are 
in nearby Sochi, Russia.  The state has invested heavily in security for 
the Olympics, and militants have threatened the international event.10  
“Awe and terror” are also reflected in considering the basic human 
dignity of the ten million people who live in that region.11  Since the 
beginning of the first Chechen war in 1994, tens of thousands have 
been killed, hundreds of thousands have been wounded and even 
more have had their lives disrupted by violence.12  Nearly a year prior 
to his death, murdered Dagestani journalist Akhmednabi 
Akhmednabiyev reflected on human rights concerns in the Republic 
and stated, “Such a feeling that time in Russia and Dagestan flows in 
the opposite direction, the authorities want to return society to the 
Stalinist-Soviet era, where the right to absolute truth belonged only to 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See Scott Shane & David M. Herszenhorn, Agents Pore Over Suspect’s Trip 
to Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/us/tamerlan-tsarnaevs-contacts-on-russian-trip-
draw-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all. 
 7. See Josh Levs & Ben Brumfield, Boston Probe Eyes Slain Canadian Jihadist, 
Source Says, CNN (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/29/us/boston-attack; 
see also Indictment, U.S. v. Tsarnaev, No. 13-2106-MBB (D. Mass. June 27, 2013), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/632013627162038513370.pdf. 
 8. See, e.g., Steven Rosenberg, Boston Bombings: Was Dagestan the Starting 
Point?, BBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-22315870. 
 9. See Gordon Hahn, The Caucasus Emirate Comes to America: The Boston 
Marathon Attack, U.S.-RUSSIA.ORG (June 20, 2013, 2:48 PM), http://us-
russia.org/1348-the-caucasus-emirate-comes-to-america-the-boston-marathon-
attack.html (providing an executive summary of the forthcoming report’s content). 
 10. See Thomas Grove, Islamist Rebel Vows ‘Maximum Force’ to Stop Sochi 
Olympics, REUTERS, July 2, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/03/us-russia-
olympics-militants-idUSBRE96207T20130703. 
 11. INT’L CRISIS GRP., THE NORTH CAUCASUS: THE CHALLENGES OF 
INTEGRATION (I), ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/220-the-north-caucasus-
the-challenges-of-integration-i-ethnicity-and-conflict.pdf (rounding up from a 
population estimate of 9.86 million). 
 12. EMMA GILLIGAN, TERROR IN CHECHNYA: RUSSIA AND THE TRAGEDY OF 
CIVILIANS IN WAR 1–14 (2010). 
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the state and its opponents were [a]waiting either endless prosecution 
or imprisonment and extrajudicial execution.”13 
This Article begins with the first contextual factor of governance.  
It sets the geopolitical stage, situating Dagestan within the Russian 
Federation and highlighting Moscow’s bungled approach to ruling 
Makhachkala.  Part II places militant violence in contemporary 
context, examining Chechnya and Dagestan.  Part III examines 
human rights issues connected to efforts to stem the violence in 
Dagestan.  While a host of human rights violations could be 
examined, the focus herein is on journalists and human rights 
defenders.  The conclusion completes the journey and reviews the 
consequences. 
The consequences addressed in that final Part are important for 
policymakers focused on the region and have comparative value as 
well.  Successful and sustainable efforts to stem political violence, 
including terrorism, must be undertaken with due consideration for 
the broader conflict context.   Such efforts, whether undertaken by 
Russia, or other countries such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom or Israel, must also be cognizant of the expansive backdrop 
constructed where state and society meet and diverge over space and 
time.  Domestic and international counterterrorism measures must be 
part and parcel of larger, more comprehensive strategies that are 
willing to embrace the complexities and intersections of geography, 
culture, politics, and history.  Through embracing these complexities, 
policymakers may find windows of opportunity to transform 
situations away from violence and toward sustainable peace, thus 
reducing the risk of terrorism, from Moscow to Makhachkala. 
I.  THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS IN CONTEXT 
Governance can be defined “as the traditions and institutions that 
determine how authority is exercised in a particular country.”14  This 
section examines Moscow’s missteps regarding two key governance 
challenges in Dagestan: the construction and management of the 
North Caucasus Federal District, and the state’s management of 
republic-level politics.  This analysis demonstrates the disconnect that 
exists between Moscow and Makhachkala and the people in between, 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev, Weekly Lashes out at Abductions, Executions 
of Dagestanis by Russian Troops, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Aug. 5, 2012, 
available at LexisNexis. 
 14. Daniel Kaufman et al., Governance Matters: From Measurement to Action, 
FIN. & DEV., June 2000, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/06/kauf.htm. 
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the citizens of the Republic.  To provide a backdrop for 
understanding these two contextual issues, this Part begins with an 
introduction to Dagestan: the land and people of the mountains. 
A. Setting the Stage: Land and People of the Mountains 
The Republic of Dagestan is situated in the southwestern corner of 
Russia, nestled in the Caucasus Mountains, a chain that runs east to 
west across southern Russia.15  The Caucasus Mountains form a real, 
physical boundary that separates the region from the rest of Russia, 
especially Moscow, the federal capital situated more than 1000 miles 
to the north of Makhachkala, the republic’s capital city.16 Within 
Russia, Dagestan’s territorial neighbors include the Republic of 
Chechnya, Stavrapol Krai, and the Republic of Kalmykiya.17  
Externally, it borders the Caspian Sea as well as the states of Georgia 
and Azerbaijan.18 
The North Caucasus, depending on perspective, could be termed a 
magnificent melding or malevolent maelstrom of topography, 
ethnicities, languages, religion, and political ambitions, including 
territorial nationalism.  Dagestan in particular embodies these 
characterizations as the most heterogeneous of its regional 
neighbors.19  The former president of Dagestan, Magomedsalam 
Magomedov, acknowledged, “Dagestan is a multiethnic republic.  We 
have more than 120 ethnic groups and 33 peoples and nationalities.”20  
Many scholars, analysts and journalists concur as it is described as 
“the most diverse republic in the Russian territories.”21  Dominant 
ethnic groups include the Avar (29.4%); Dargin (17%); Kumyk 
                                                                                                                 
 15. KING, supra note 2, at 7–10. 
 16. See THOMAS DEWAAL, THE CAUCASUS: AN INTRODUCTION 6 (2010); 
GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow “Get Directions” hyperlink; then 
search “A” for “Moscow, Russia” and search “B” for “Makhachkala, Dagestan;” 
then follow “Get Directions” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (giving driving 
directions from Moscow, Russia to Makhachkala, Dagestan). 
 17. KING, supra note 2, at 2.  For constitutional distinctions between the types of 
administrative units, see infra notes 32–33. 
 18. KING, supra note 2, at 2. 
 19. INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 11, at 3. 
 20. Russia Dagestan Head Discusses Work to Prevent Ethnic, Religious Tensions, 
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Oct. 8, 2012, available at LexisNexis. 
 21. See, e.g., Chechnya and Dagestan Are Not the Same Thing: A Brief Look at 
Conflict in the Caucasus, CENT. EURASIA STANDARD (Apr. 19, 2013), 
https://cestandard.wordpress.com/2013/04/19/chechnya-and-dagestan-are-not-the-
same-thing-a-brief-look-at-conflict-in-the-caucasus. 
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(14.9%); and the Lezgin (13.3).22  Less concurrence is found regarding 
the total population numbers: an increase of nearly half a million 
persons between the 2002 and 2010 census has been called “an 
astonishing and suspiciously high spike of population.”23  Russian 
census numbers put the population at 2.9 million, with approximately 
700,000 residing in Makhachkala.24 
Within the population, the rise, fall, and entrenchment of various 
faiths and sects have been interwoven with the historical ambitions of 
empires, including Persia, the Ottomans, and Russia, as well as local 
geography of mountains and valleys.25  Islam first arrived in Dagestan 
in the seventh century; since then, various schools and sects thereof 
have held sway with the population.26  Sunni and Sufi Islam have 
emerged as the dominant forms, and both have helped shape 
repeated resistance to Russia’s hegemonic efforts in the North 
Caucasus.27  On this point, however, intellectual caution urges against 
essentializing: 
Historians and more contemporary analysts both sympathetic and 
antagonistic to the mountaineers’ resistance routinely emphasize the 
fundamental importance of Islam in the Caucasian Wars [of 
centuries past], arguing (or assuming) that religion served as the 
prime motivation in the mountaineers’ resistance against the 
Russian infidel . . . . [However, Islam’s] significance lies less in its 
ability to motivate resistance than as a guide for how the resisters 
should organize their communal lives.28 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Anna Mateeva, The North Caucasus and the Challenges of Minority 
Governance, in MANAGING ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN RUSSIA 134 (Oleh Protsyk & 
Benedikt Harzl eds., 2013). 
 23. Valery Dzutsev, North Caucasus Demographics Show the Regional 
Administrations’ Power to Skew Figures, JAMESTOWN FOUND., Apr. 6, 2011, 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37756. 
 24. After the Previous Census Population of Dagestan Went up by Almost 
400,000, CAUCASIAN KNOT, Nov. 17, 2010, http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/15225. 
 25. See generally GREGORY HOSKING, RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIANS (2011) 
(providing an overarching history); ROBERT BRUCE WARE & ENVER KISRIEV, 
DAGESTAN: RUSSIAN HEGEMONY AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE IN THE NORTH 
CAUCASUS (2010). 
 26. See generally WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25, particularly chapters 2 and 5. 
 27. See id.; see also HOSKING, supra note 25; SCHAEFER, supra note 2. 
 28. Michael Reynolds, Myths and Mysticism: A Longitudinal Perspective on 
Islam and Conflict in the North Caucasus, 41 MIDDLE E. STUDIES 31, 39 (2005). 
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B. The North Caucasus Federal District: Adding Fuel to a 
Governance Fire 
Within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or the 
Soviet Union), organizing the public lives of the citizenry was the 
state’s job.29 When the USSR collapsed in December 1991, one state 
vanished from the map and fifteen new ones emerged in its stead, 
including the Russian Federation.30  According to its constitution, 
Russia is a democratic state with “a republican form of 
government.”31  The Republic of Dagestan is one of eighty-three 
administrative divisions that comprise the federation.32  It is part of 
the North Caucasus Federal District, one of eight meta-governance 
constructions within Russia, which bridges the political gap between 
the multitude of smaller entities and the federal state.33   Originally, 
seven districts were created by presidential decree in May of 2000, by 
the then newly-elected President Vladimir Putin, and from 2000 until 
2010, Dagestan was part of the Southern Federal District.34  Putin 
viewed the North Caucasus from the perspective that “the problems 
of this region required political transformation.”35  Some observers 
have characterized his organization of the districts as part of his 
power vertical approach to governing Russia.36  Yet, the power 
vertical, understood as an “effort to establish a vertical chain of 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See MARK R. BESSINGER, NATIONALIST MOBILIZATION AND THE COLLAPSE 
OF THE SOVIET STATE 50 (2002) (“Throughout its 74-year history the Soviet regime 
engaged in a massive and frequently forceful effort to impose a particular vision on a 
multicultural population . . . . Soviet rulers consistently attempted to create a civic 
form of political and cultural allegiance, a sense of patriotism and shared political 
identity.”). 
 30. RICHARD SAKWA, RUSSIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 420 (2008). 
 31. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 1 
(RUSS.), available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/ConstMain.shtml (last 
visited July 15, 2013). 
 32. See Russian Federation—About the Country, UNITED NATIONS DEV. 
PROGRAM, http://www.undp.ru/index.php?iso=RU&lid=1&pid=38 (last visited July 
15, 2013); see also KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] 
[CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (RUSS.) (“A republic (state) shall have its own constitution and 
legislation.  A kray (or krai), oblast, city of federal significance, autonomous oblast 
and autonomous okrug shall have its own charter and legislation.”).  For the full text 
of the constitution, see supra note 31. 
 33. Liz Fuller, Medvedev Creates New North Caucasus Federal District, RADIO 
FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (Jan. 20, 2010), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Medvedev_Creates_New_North_Caucasus_Federal_Dis
trict/1934705.html. 
 34. Id.  Putin had served as acting prime minister to President Boris Yeltsin, then 
replaced him as acting president before he was elected in March 2000. 
 35. WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25, at 3. 
 36. RICHARD SAWKA, PUTIN – RUSSIA’S CHOICE 130 (2010). 
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hierarchical authority, with strong, uncompromising government from 
the top,”37 is inconsistent with Dagestan’s political norms, which have 
historically valued collegiality and “pluralistic representation.”38 
President Dmitri Medvedev, who succeeded Putin after the latter 
had served two terms, undertook a reorganization of the Southern 
Federal District, purportedly because he observed ongoing obstacles 
to this transformation.39  For example, in 2009, he acknowledged the 
continuing problem of regional corruption and stated that although a 
lot of money is earmarked for the North Caucasus, “the efficiency of 
its spending leaves much to be desired.  Moreover, part of the money 
is almost openly embezzled by officials. This happens as the 
unemployment and poverty in the Caucasus reaches extreme 
heights.”40  The costs of corruption were known: in 2008, joining the 
police could set you back $3000, medical school, $10,000 and some 
government positions went for $300,000.41  Human Rights Watch 
averred, “Corruption in Dagestan long ago reached astounding 
proportions. The power structures seem to have merged fully with the 
criminal world.”42  Meanwhile, significant portions of the population 
were economically marginalized (up to eighty percent 
unemployment), rendered vulnerable and unable to access the 
mechanisms of power through which they might change their 
circumstance.43  In the long term, this has all told to mean that Russia 
has compromised the development of ethical government, 
accountable public safety personnel and accessible health care, 
undermining the physical security and well-being of the population. 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Andrew Monaghan, The Vertikal: Power and Authority in Russia, 88 INT’L 
AFF. 1, 8 (2012). 
 38. Stephen Blank, Russia’s Caucasus Wars: The Wrecks of Empire and the Wars 
of Decolonization, 34 AM. FOREIGN POL’Y INTERESTS 182, 184 (2012). 
 39. For more on the Putin-Medvedev “tandem” of governance, see generally 
MARIE MENDRAS, RUSSIAN POLITICS: THE PARADOX OF A WEAK STATE (2012). 
 40. Down-to-Earth Problems at the Core of Medvedev’s Second Address, RT 
(Nov. 12, 2009), http://rt.com/news/medvedev-annual-address-modernization. 
 41. INT’L CRISIS GRP., RUSSIA’S DAGESTAN: CONFLICT CAUSES 13 (2008), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/192_russia_s_dagestan_conflict_caus
es. 
 42. Tanya Lokshina, Dagestan: Curse of the Sixth Department, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (May 18, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/18/dagestan-curse-sixth-
department. 
 43. Briefing: Dagestan: A New Flashpoint in Russia’s North Caucasus, COMM’N 
ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION EUR. (June 16, 2009), 
http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewTranscript&ContentRe
cord_id=453. 
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Problems notwithstanding, for Medvedev, the challenges of the 
North Caucasus had identifiable solutions, at least in theory. He 
stated: 
We will do everything possible to allow the people in Russia’s 
Caucasus to lead normal lives. Economic and humanitarian 
programmes [sic] for the south of the country will soon be reviewed 
and fleshed out . . . . At the same time, law enforcement authorities 
will continue to stamp out the bandits who seek to intimidate and 
terrorise [sic] the population of some Caucasian republics with their 
crazy ideas and barbaric customs.44 
Later that month, he again justified the state’s use of force in the 
region and added “it would be better if there were none of it.  But we 
have completely failed to use economic tools.”45  To address the 
former and remedy the latter, Medvedev appointed Alexsander 
Khloponin as Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the North 
Caucasus and Deputy Prime Minister for the Russian Federation.46  
The envoy was granted 
powers of economic nature, powers connected with the performance 
of duties as government deputy chairman and, on the other hand, 
powers connected with the performance of duties in the presidential 
vertical channel of command, or all the powers traditionally wielded 
by the presidential representative in a federal district pertaining to 
personnel, work with power and law-enforcement structures, and all 
other issues within the official authority of plenipotentiary 
representative.47 
In short, he was granted a lot of theoretical power.  Nearly two 
years into his term, the presidential plenipotentiary had a cautiously 
optimistic assessment of the work his administration had undertaken: 
“The attitude and mindset of the people who reside and work in the 
North Caucasus is changing in many respects, as is their attitude to 
the federal centre and the federal centre’s attitude to the events 
unfolding here, including political developments.”48 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Dmitry Medvedev’s Article, Go Russia!, PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA (Sept. 10, 
2009), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/298. 
 45. Medvedev Says Russia Must “Learn to Use Economic Tools” In North 
Caucasus, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Sept. 15, 2009, available at LexisNexis. 
 46. See Medvedev Names Ex-Top Manager as Envoy to Volatile Caucasus, 
RIANOVOSTI (Jan. 19, 2010), http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100119/157615846.html. 
 47. Russian Pundits “Surprised” by Tandem’s Choice for Envoy to Caucasus, 
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Jan. 22, 2010, available at LexisNexis. 
 48. Russian President’s Envoy Discusses North Caucasus, BBC WORLDWIDE 
MONITORING, Dec. 19, 2012, available at LexisNexis. 
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Others have had less favorable assessments of Khloponin, as well 
as the post he occupies, and he has been criticized as being politically 
impotent.  An editorial in Gazeta.ru lamented Russia’s lack of a 
coherent policy and unrealistic development expectations for the 
region as well as the limited political stature of the envoy.49  The 
Jamestown Foundation added that Moscow’s “top-down approach . . . 
to the economic development of the North Caucasus has produced 
little progress so far.”50  Overall, “diminished political access and local 
accountability that resulted from renewed centralization led to 
increased levels of corruption, alienation, radicalism and terrorism in 
this volatile region.”51  Baev further observed (although some may 
disagree) that the identification of the problem, in part, had missed its 
mark.52  Rather than having economic or developmental roots, “[i]t is 
the paternalistic political system based on administrative corruption 
that generates social discontent and fosters extremism.  However, 
neither Khloponin nor Medvedev have any idea how to transform 
it.”53  Thus, neither the South nor the North Caucasus Federal 
Districts have fixed what politically ails Dagestan, and they likely 
created a context that worsened the situation.  Notably, Moscow has 
not fared much better with their approach to local governance at the 
republic level. 
1. Dagestan: All Politics Is Local?54 
As a republic within Russia’s federal system, Dagestan has a local 
government: an executive, a parliament, and a judiciary.55  It also has 
its own constitution, promulgated in July 1994 and subsequently 
amended.56  Dagestan’s internal governance structures, due in part to 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See Russian Editorial Says Putin Shows Little Interest in North Caucasus, 
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Aug. 15, 2012, available at LexisNexis. 
 50. Jamestown Foundation, Moscow’s Envoy to the North Caucasus Expected to 
Assume Greater Powers, REFWORLD (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.refworld.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=printdoc&docid=514079d12. 
 51. WARE & KISRIEV, supra note 25, at 3. 
 52. See Pavel Baev, The Terrorism-Corruption Nexus in the North Caucasus, 114 
PONARS EURASIA POLICY MEMO 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/pepm_114.pdf. 
 53. Id. 
 54. This is a creative application of Tip O’Neil’s famous phrase. See TIP O’NEIL, 
ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL (1994). 
 55. See THE PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF DAGESTAN, http://eng.nsrd.ru (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2013); REPUBLIC OF DAGESTAN, http://www.government-rd.ru (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
 56. See Nabi Abdullaev, Constitutional Amendments Threaten to Destabilize 
Situation in Dagestan, JAMESTOWN FOUND. (Apr. 17, 1998), 
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ethnic heterogeneity and developing competition for power amongst 
ascendant groups and clans, had depended on local, internal 
bargaining between various elites and factions.57  Since Putin’s ascent 
to power, however, the federal government has been playing a game 
of political paddleball with Dagestan’s government, and Dagestan is 
losing. 
To diffuse potential ethnic tensions over leadership, the 
constitution originally called for an executive centered on a state 
council whose head would ostensibly rotate amongst Dagestan’s key 
ethnic groups.58  Building on that centralization theme, in 2000, 
Moscow asked Dagestani officials to proffer a list of constitutional 
discrepancies between the republic and federal levels, which were 
then addressed.59  Many of the changes made subordinated 
Dagestan’s internal independence within the federation, while at the 
same time elevating federal power within the republic’s constitution.60  
In 2003, subsequent amendments, instigated by Moscow, reoriented 
more power away from the republic and towards the center, including 
the elimination of the State Council and the creation of a presidential 
executive.61  Pointedly, the State Council had been described as a 
“collegial executive body,” comprised of Dagestan’s key ethnic 
groups.62  In 2005, prior to its dismantlement, one observer sagely 
noted, 
[T]he republic’s people firmly believe that the collegiate form of 
government (even a curtailed one) prevents the monopolization of 
power and property by an ethnic community.  The ethnic elite and 
the people of Dagestan think that a rejection of ethnic collegiality 
would lead to a redivision of property, power and administrative 
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benefits and hence plunge the republic into chaos and 
arbitrariness.63 
This is not to suggest that the State Council was perfect in 
construction or practice.64  Rather, Moscow was removing 
mechanisms through which Dagestanis had managed ethnic affairs 
and the republic.65  Moreover, these constitutional changes were put 
in place without most Dagestanis’ support.66  Consequently, “those 
who were aggrieved would likely grow in number and could only seek 
supporters and allies who cast themselves in opposition to Moscow.”67  
Moscow, however, did not seem to be paying attention to a plurality 
of local concerns. 
A major, federal political change in 2004 was channeled through 
the lens of the tragic events at Beslan, in North Ossetia, in early 
September of that year.68  At Beslan’s School Number One, militants 
opposed to Russia’s Chechnya policy stormed a local school and held 
more than a thousand people hostage, including several hundred 
children.69  When the siege was over more than three hundred were 
dead, including more than 150 children, and hundreds were 
wounded.70  In remarks responding to the tragedy, President Putin 
stated, “In general, we need to admit that we did not show an 
understanding of the complexities and dangers of the processes 
occurring in our own country and in the world.”71  On one level, he 
was correct—there had been a profound failure to understand the 
roots of the conflict and effectively mitigate grievances, let alone 
appreciate the dynamic nature of the threat or the state’s 
vulnerabilities.  However, rather than respond in a contextually 
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appropriate way, the Russian president consolidated the Kremlin’s 
power and signed new legislation stipulating the presidential 
appointment of local leaders.72 
Putin’s effective removal of the republics’ authority to directly elect 
their own leaders was part of “a series of counter-reforms aimed at 
tightening the political regime . . . . [W]ith some elements of 
decorative (mock) democracy.”73  This change was likely acutely felt 
in Makhachkala in 2006 when Magomedali Magomedov, who had 
ruled Dagestan since Soviet times, left office.74  While some have 
expressed surprise at his departure, others have characterized it as an 
orchestrated or forced retirement, with Putin clearly calling the 
shots.75  Magomedov, an ethnic Dargin, was replaced by Mukhu 
Aliyev, an ethnic Avar.76  Recall that Dagestan’s constitution 
originally envisioned a shifting of power within the ethnic leadership 
of the State Council.  Nevertheless, through a range of machinations, 
Magomedov had maintained power.77  Thus, the swing in control from 
a powerful, but smaller ethnic group, the Dargins, to the Avars, the 
largest, was a significant shift at the Republic level.78  While on the 
one hand, the ascent of an Avar leader assuaged some of their 
concerns, it also “alienated the Dargin economic elite and created 
grievances.”79  Moscow was meddling again, without an apparent 
appreciation of the context or consequences. 
Aliyev remained in power until early 2010, when the Kremlin 
appointed Magomedsalam Magomedov (son of the former leader 
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Magomedali) to lead Dagestan.80  His ascent to power coincided with 
that of the new and aforementioned Presidential Plenipotentiary 
Khlopinin, to change tacks in dealing with the North Caucasus.81  Part 
of the purported rationale for appointing Aliyev was centered on the 
belief that he would tackle corruption in the republic, which was seen 
as a root of a range of problems, including militancy and criminality.82  
Yet, when the younger Magomedov came to power, it was said that 
“corruption, economic stagnation and massive unemployment are 
part of the legacy Magomedov inherited from his 
predecessor . . . [yet] all those phenomena took root during the 14 
years that Magomedov’s father, Magomedali, was republic head.”83  
Aliyev’s detractors said he lacked the political power or cache to 
“control the factions beneath him.”84  Consequently, rather than 
mitigating the problems posed by corruption, they apparently became 
more entrenched on his watch. 
In 2012, then-President Medvedev moved to devolve authority 
back to the republics, again allowing for direct elections.85  
Contrastingly, less than year later, after Putin retook the presidency, 
he moved to again recentralize authority over the region’s 
executives.86  Noting the impending Olympics in nearby Sochi and the 
ongoing unrest in the North Caucasus, a reporter observed, “The 
Kremlin is concerned that direct elections in the volatile regions could 
spark unrest or involve candidates whose loyalty is in question.”87  
Within the month, Dagestan had scrapped its local election law, the 
first of the republics to do so.88 
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It is unclear whether this political mismanagement is a result of 
ignorance, disdain, or intermittent disregard for Dagestan.  
Contrastingly, the consequences are more visible: a population 
lacking faith in its government, set against a backdrop of violent 
instability.  As the year 2013 dawned, Magomedov resigned (likely 
with a push from Putin) and Moscow appointed another new leader 
for Dagestan, Ramazan Abdulatipov, an ethnic Avar.89  Abdulatipov 
acknowledged as much when he said, “The main question today is 
how to restore the people’s confidence in the government?  How to 
overcome apathy and even rejection that actions of some of [the] big 
guns in Dagestan caused?”90 
2. Moscow’s Meddling while Makhachkala’s Burning 
The constitutional amendments, tinkering with the appointment, 
and actual selection of regional leaders evince Moscow’s 
misunderstanding of the Makhachkala and broader Dagestani 
political context.  Alternatively, they spotlight the center’s 
indifference or contempt for the local governance environment.  
According to a regional expert: 
There is a big disconnect between the political cultures of Moscow 
and Dagestan. This is the [sic] partly the cause of misunderstandings 
and conflict between the two.  Moscow is trying to impose a 
downsized model of Russian governance on Dagestan, but that does 
not work, because Dagestan is so ethnically diverse.  Dagestan is 
naturally immune to being ruled by a strong hand, whereas for 
Russia, a highly-centralised [sic] state is a very traditional form of 
governance.91 
Overall, this game of political paddleball or push-pull of federal-
local control, without due regard for the local, political environment, 
has undermined the development of an indigenous democracy in 
Dagestan.  Additionally, the tenacity of corruption and ineffective 
state response, “has given rise to a huge gulf between the authorities 
and the population at large.”92  Accordingly, rather than bringing 
those within the Republic closer to the center, Moscow’s rule of 
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Makhachkala has only served to exacerbate the space between the 
two. 
II.  FROM GROZNY TO MOSCOW TO MAKHACHKALA: MILITANT 
VIOLENCE IN CONTEXT 
Governance issues between Moscow and Makhachkala are only 
one of the problems that plague Dagestan; militant violence is 
another, and it is the focus of this Part.  The casual observer of the 
region is likely to associate violence and terrorism in the region with 
the neighboring republic of Chechnya, which is where this section 
begins.  Notably, Chechnya is not Dagestan, and the two republics 
have travelled different historio-political paths.  The International 
Crisis Group rightly reminds us that “[t]here is a common yet 
erroneous tendency to analyse [sic] Dagestan in reference to 
Chechnya.”93  While accurate, it is important to understand the role 
the Chechen wars have played in the destabilization of the region and 
thus Dagestan.  This step back in time creates context and provides a 
glimpse into Moscow’s other North Caucasian miscalculations.  
Chechnya, after all, has been the locus of two pitched battles with the 
federal state, its citizens, as well as Russian soldiers, all of whom have 
been used as fodder in a battle for control in the region.94  While 
Russia retreated in defeat from the first Chechen war, in the wake of 
the second it has largely regained control of the territory through 
brute force and the installation of local officials.  Markedly, overt, 
large-scale conflict in Chechnya has declined in recent years, relative 
to the intense devastation of the two wars.  However, areas of the 
larger North Caucasus remain restive, and Dagestan is a focal point 
for ongoing violence and the second half of this section. 95 
A. The Chechen Context: “We Shall Respond to Every Chechen 
Shot with Thousands of Our Own”96 
The first Chechen War did not happen out of the blue.  The seeds 
were sown as the 1980s drew to a close and the Soviet Union emitted 
its last gasps, when a local, national, Chechen campaign for self-
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determination began to emerge.97  At the same time, the economic 
situation in the region declined, in part due a reduction in budgetary 
subsidies.98  The conditions in Chechnya were already dire with poor 
health services, low wages, and inadequate educational 
opportunities.99  A potent combination resulted, and some Chechens 
advocated for self-rule while marginalized groups also advocated for 
economic and “social justice.”100  Gall and de Waal echo this 
dichotomy contrasting an uprising against historic wrongs, and the 
underprivileged rebelling against “appalling” poverty.101 
The Chechen uprising also unfolded amidst a complicated web of 
Soviet and post-Soviet politics with competing centers of power, and 
the North Caucasian Republic became ensnared.102  During the 
Russian withdrawals of the early 1990s, the military left behind an 
unfathomable amount of weapons—ranging from tanks to rocket 
launchers to guns.103  This situation was compounded by Moscow’s lag 
time in responding to Chechen aspirations and an underestimation of 
the threat.104  Chechen leader Dhjokar Dudaev tried to capitalize on 
the apparent disorganization of Russian troops who “were effectively 
leaderless and in a state of complete confusion” with various national 
and regional leaders also “vying for their support.”105  At the same 
time, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Under Dudaev’s 
leadership, the Chechen nationalist movement . . . [became] 
increasingly radical in its demands, ultimately pressing for 
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independence from the Russian Republic.”106  By one account, within 
a few years, “Chechnya had turned into a Shakespearean kingdom—
armed groups roamed the country at will and there were no fixed 
borders or front lines.”107 
By mid-December 1994, after a number of Chechen and Russian 
missteps, Russian troops were officially on the move and their 
destination was Grozny, the capital of Chechnya.108  A journalistic 
viewpoint offers that the first war started as Russia tried to restore 
order by force and stem Chechen strides toward independence.109  
One scholar adds that the proximate cause of the conflict “was the 
rapid escalation of political turmoil and civil strife within Chechnya, 
as well as the rapid escalation of the organised [sic] criminal activity 
and terrorism spilling beyond its borders into neighbouring [sic] 
republics.”110  Through a reading of these and other accounts, it is 
clear a number of political, security and international concerns at the 
regional and federal levels played a role in the conflagration.111  Given 
this range of factors over time, it is also clear that Russia missed 
opportunities to at least attempt to transform the conflict away from 
violence. 
Instead, Russia plunged the republic into a bloody struggle that 
would last for nearly two years.112  During the ensuing war, Grozny 
was devastated.  Official, reliable government casualty reports are 
virtually nonexistent.113  Alternatively, after a review of various 
figures and sources, Dunlop estimates there were approximately 
46,500 deaths in the first war.114  Nevertheless, war is about far more 
than numbers—it is also about the impact on the humans left behind.  
Gilligan found that “[c]ivilians recall being unprepared, shocked by 
the indiscriminate bombing and the lack of warning to ensure safe 
evacuation. Thousands of people abandoned the city, but thousands, 
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especially elderly Russians and Chechens, were stranded in 
Grozny.”115  A longer-term political consequence was also evident: 
prior to the start of the war, Grozny hosted a significant population of 
ethnic Russians (as opposed to ethnic Chechens) as well as a 
“Chechen professional class,” a university, and other institutes of 
intellectual as well as artistic importance.116  Thus, Grozny’s 
destruction undermined settlement because Russia eliminated “the 
very constituency of Chechnya’s residents who were most 
sympathetic to political accommodation with Russia and who also 
were agents of modernization inside society.  At a stroke Russia’s 
bombers set back Chechnya two generations, from an urbanized 
republic with an educated elite to a rural village economy.”117 
While Grozny and other parts of Chechnya were destroyed, it was 
Russia that emerged defeated at the end of the conflict.118  A number 
of incidents factored into the conclusion of this first war.  Although 
the following, select incidents are not exhaustive, they are illustrative 
of a broad set of factors that led to the initial drawdown of hostilities. 
First, the personal experiences of the leaders were key, and a lack of 
empathy impeded settlement.119  For example, in April 1996 Dudaev 
was assassinated in a Russian missile attack.120  The Chechen leader 
had been a proverbial thorn in Yeltsin’s side and his death was said to 
make the cessation of overt hostilities more politically palatable.121  
Second, the Russians underestimated the Chechen military abilities 
and overestimated their own.122  This was strikingly evident when 
Chechen militants garnered a series of victories (from their 
perspective), including the surprising (to some) retaking of Grozny in 
August of 1996.123  Finally, external intervention, in the right 
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circumstances, helped: the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) sponsored negotiations that led to an interim 
accord and treaty.124  Had Russia better understood the Chechen 
context, all of these issues could have been dealt with differently 
before 1996, before tens of thousands of Russians and Chechens were 
killed and even more had their lives profoundly altered. 
The Khasavyurt accords paused the killing and brutality, but did 
not bring peace, let alone a sustainable end to violence in 
Chechnya.125  Rather it provided a respite, during which Russia 
regrouped before a brutal second military engagement.126  Chechnya 
was physically and economically distraught, and for some, lawlessness 
became the norm.127  It also grappled with the politicization and 
manipulation of Islam.  As the various militant “groups had no source 
of employment and eventually formed a political opposition to the 
government.  [Chechen leader Aslan] Maskhadov invited members of 
the radical political opposition . . . into his government and adopted 
elements of their program to forge an illusion of national unity.”128 
Shamil Basayev was part of Chechnya’s radical resistance, and he 
was part of Maskhadov’s government, serving from April 1997 to July 
1999, first as deputy prime minister then as acting prime minister.129  
He was also the most infamous of his lot.130  Basayev was allegedly 
responsible for some of the more notorious Chechen attacks in 
Russia.131  These included an attack on a hospital at Budyonnovsk (in 
neighboring Stavropol Krai).  In June of 2005, Basayev led a group of 
militants who stormed the hospital and took more than 1000 hostages, 
include many women and children.132  The siege persisted despite 
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Russian military assaults on the hospital, which actually killed and 
wounded several of the hostages.133  Ultimately, the Russian 
government directly negotiated with Basayev, the remaining hostages 
were released, and the militants were permitted to return to 
Chechnya.134  The second, and better-known attack was the 
aforementioned school siege at Beslan in North Ossetia, where more 
than a thousand were held hostage, and hundreds perished, including 
many children.135  Clearly what happens in Chechnya does not stay in 
Chechnya, as Basayev took the war to the Russians.  Notably, he is 
also imputed with taking the war to Dagestan, where an onslaught of 
violence was subsequently unleashed. 136 
Approximately one month before invading Dagestan, Shamil 
Basayev resigned from Mashkadov’s government.137  Importantly, 
Basayev’s actions did not necessarily cause the second Chechen war, 
but rather helped create a context in which Russia could justify its 
subsequent actions.  Basayev’s incursions into Dagestan were 
purportedly undertaken to create a trans-Caucasian mountain state; 
however, he and his melee of militants were pushed back by Russian 
forces as a new prime minister, Vladimir Putin, was chosen to lead 
Russia for the first time in 1999.138  Basayev’s efforts and the Russian 
state’s response were also juxtaposed against a series of apartment 
bombings that took place in cities around the country.  Those 
bombings resulted in hundreds of casualties, and remain mired in 
speculation about the perpetrators.139  Basayev’s true aims in invading 
Dagestan, given the relative size and capacity of his forces and the 
fact that local Dagestanis rose up against him, remain a bit of a 
mystery.140 
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B. Militant Violence in Context: From Grozny to Makhachkala 
to Moscow 
Less mysterious, but perhaps more complex, is Dagestan’s related 
descent into religious and political violence.  Moscow’s failure to 
connect the dots between Dagestani internal politics, Putin’s 
centralization efforts, the Chechen conflagrations, and the 
development of “indigenous” Dagestani violence, have not only 
precluded meaningful solutions, but have also increased insecurity 
and violence. 
The first missed connection relates to Basayev’s incursion and the 
local response.  When the militants invaded, many in the Republic 
turned toward Moscow and the military, rather than their purported 
liberators, some of whom embraced a particular approach to Islam 
termed Wahhabism.141  Dagestan rejected the militants partly because 
“Wahhabis were generally viewed as aligned with Chechen invaders 
and because the Wahhabis had attempted to import an alien ideology 
with foreign assistance.”142  Importantly, however, in the interwar 
years, clashes occurred in Dagestan between “traditionalist Muslims 
and ‘Wahhabis.’”143  Wahhabism can be viewed as an austere form of 
Islam, which was at odds with local Dagestani practice.144  In Russia, 
the term Wahhabi has been erroneously used, demonizing Muslims, 
often rendering it (and them) synonymous with Islamic terrorism.145  
Esposito adds that “[g]overnments [broadly] find the label ‘Wahhabi’ 
especially useful because it implies a foreign source for indigenous 
problems and equates their political opposition with an ‘Islamic 
threat.’”146  In Dagestan, the Makhachkala government reacted to the 
idea of a Wahhabi threat by outlawing Wahhabism.147  Ware adds that 
“[o]rdinary Wahhabis were viewed as traitors and pariahs, and 
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Wahhabi leaders were arrested or driven into hiding.”148  The head of 
the Memorial human rights organization acknowledged the religious 
orientation of the conflict and added that “[f]undamentalist Islam is 
the ideology of the underground.  But far from everyone professing 
unconventional Islam in Dagestan is a terrorist.  Unfortunately, the 
authorities in Dagestan fail to see the difference.”149  This 
demonization has helped fuel marginalization, additional human 
rights violations, including forced disappearances, and insecurity.150 
Marginalization and human rights violations have not been 
restricted to Dagestan.  Back in Chechnya, Russia’s policies of 
“Chechenization,” the installation of the Kadyovs as successive 
presidents (Aslan until his assassination in 2003, followed soon 
thereafter by his son Ramzan, in power as of this writing), and the 
death of key militant leaders helped tamp down violent resistance 
within Chechnya, albeit at a horrific cost.151 Torture, forced 
disappearances, kidnapping, and other forms of brutality became 
Chechnya’s new normal.152  For example, between 3000 and 5000 were 
disappeared in Chechnya between 1999 and 2005.153  Several years 
later, in 2009, Tanya Lokshina, the veteran Human Rights Watch 
advocate, wrote about 
families whose houses had been burned down because they were 
accused of having a family member among the rebels hiding in the 
mountains.  The only conclusion you can make after looking at the 
striking pattern of burnings is that government forces were 
responsible for them.  At first the families had been warned—please 
get your relatives out of the woods and bring them to us, or there 
will be trouble.  Serious trouble.  You raised them, so you are 
responsible for them.154 
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Going into the woods or the forest has become a euphemism for 
joining the militants.155  Importantly, going into the forest is also a 
choice, and choices are made in a context. 
Part of that context is created by state and state-sanctioned 
brutality, which has not respected the North Caucasian borders.  The 
Dagestanis have correspondingly known horrific violence, also at the 
hands of federal and republic-level authorities as well as militants.  
Statistics paint a grim picture: in 2012, 405 were killed and nearly 300 
wounded in conflict related violence.156  In 2011, 413 died and more 
than 400 were injured, again in conflict related violence.  In 2012 
there were 53 “explosions and terror acts,” while 86 occurred in 
2011.157  In 2009, the same year Lokshina wrote of Chechen house 
burnings, in Dagestan, “427 persons died or suffered” in conflict-
related incidents.158  O’Loughlin asserts the violence in Dagestan and 
other neighboring republics is “due to Russia’s heavy-handed 
counter-insurgency techniques, entrenched corruption and 
government ineffectiveness, and a pervasive lack of economic 
development and grim employment prospects for young men.”159  
Russia is not necessarily causing militant violence, but rather has a 
key role in creating a context in which some might make a choice to 
go into the forest, when under different circumstances, they would 
have been quite content to stay at home. 
Analyses of those who do join the forest dwellers tend to focus on 
the Chechen war and its relation to broader North Caucasian 
violence.  It has further honed in on “a loose network of formally 
autonomous violent groups, or Islamic jamaats” that subsequently 
sprung up in the region.160  There has been a range of nonstate actors 
at work, wreaking havoc and causing violence, including Shariat 
Jamaat and the oft-cited Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, or 
Caucasus Emirate.161 
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Shariat Jamaat has stated it was founded in 1999;162 however, it 
really entered the spotlight with a series of attacks in 2004 and 2005.163  
The Jamestown Foundation assessed that the organization was in fact 
the “direct successor” of a group allegedly dismantled by Putin in 
1999.  The Foundation noted that “it is one more example of how 
inefficient a military response is for suppressing an ideological 
opponent.  It is possible to destroy bases, to destroy active 
participants, but it is quite impossible to destroy an underlying 
ideology using tanks and planes.”164  In early 2005 the group “stepped 
up its activities” under the leadership of Rasul Maksharipov, an 
ethnic Avar and veteran of the Chechen wars, unleashing scores of 
attacks that killed dozens of police officers.165  In March of that year, 
Shariat released a hit list of intended targets, including government 
and security officials at the federal and republic levels.166  By 2008, the 
International Crisis Group reported, “it is increasingly clear that such 
groups—Shariat Jamaat being the best known—not only persist but 
are playing an ever larger role in the escalating street war” that was 
plaguing Dagestan.167 
The Caucasus Emirate is likely the most well-known of the groups, 
particularly outside of the region. Its leader, Dokka Umarov, 
proclaimed its existence in the fall of 2007 and called for a 
reconquering of historic Muslim lands.168  He stated, “I don’t think 
that it is necessary to draw the borders of the Caucasus Emirate,” but 
proceeded to include Dagestan and Karbadino-Balkaria (a 
neighboring republic), amongst others.169  The Shariat Jamaat 
apparently pledged loyalty to Umarov and his pan-Caucasian efforts 
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in late November 2007.170  Analysts observed that this “recent 
statement of support . . . suggests an expanding political agenda.”171  
Separatist Chechen leader Akhmed Zakayev responded to Umarov’s 
declaration, stating in part: 
The very proclamation of an emirate, even a verbal one, would help 
the Russian leadership to mobilize even more forces to carry out the 
genocide of the peoples of the North Caucasus, who are even more 
vigorously calling for their ethnic and religious rights.  A “North 
Caucasian Emirate” would play a provocative role, one which was 
once played by the congress of the peoples of Chechnya and 
Dagestan, which contributed towards the second invasion by 
Russian troops of Chechnya.172 
Provocation has also come in the form of attacks emanating from 
the Caucasus Emirate, Shariat and other nonstate actors, which have 
focused on the police and security forces. These groups have also 
targeted regional religious leaders and transportation targets around 
Russia.  For example, in June 2005, Shariat claimed responsibility for 
the deaths of ten Russian soldiers in Makhachkala.173  By 2007, it was 
targeting religious leaders and murdered a deputy mufti, 
Kurbangomed Ramazanov, also in the capital city.174  As 2008 wound 
down, General Valery Lipinsky, a Russian Interior Ministry official 
and leader of its forces there, was shot in Makhachkala and later died; 
others were wounded.175  The Dagestani Minister of the Interior, 
Adilgerey Magomedtagirov, was killed in the region’s capital, as he 
left a wedding in June 2009.176  At the end of March 2010, two 
Dagestani women detonated explosive devices, within an hour of 
each other, in separate Moscow metro stations.  The attacks killed 
dozens and wounded scores.177  At the same time, attacks in Kizlyar 
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(Dagestan) left at least a dozen people dead, including nine police 
officers.  In May 2012, more than ten were killed and scores wounded 
in a dual-pronged attack on police and emergency services in 
Makhachkala.  The first targeted a police station; the second, the 
rescue and investigative personnel who arrived on the scene.178 
One attack the militants specifically disavowed was the Boston 
Marathon bombing in April 2013.  The “Command of the Province of 
Dagestan” was very careful in distancing itself from any connection 
with attack.179  It issued a statement clearly highlighting Russia as the 
enemy and also noting Umarov’s order against striking civilian targets 
outside the region.180  However, by the summer of 2013, this order was 
rescinded.181  Umarov had set his sights, literally, on the 2014 winter 
Olympics in Sochi, an area near the North Caucasus.182  He stated, 
They (Russia) plan to hold the Olympics on the bones of our 
ancestors, on the bones of many, many dead Muslims, buried on the 
territory of our land on the Black Sea, and we as mujahideen are 
obliged to not permit that, using any methods allowed us by the 
almighty Allah . . . . I call on you, every mujahid, either in Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan or on the territory of the Caucasus to use maximum 
force on the path of Allah to disrupt this Satanic dancing on the 
bones of our ancestors.183 
C. Wars and Peace? 
The motivations and justifications for much of the militant violence 
in Dagestan are fairly clear.  Richardson notes, 
By far the most common motive for their actions asserted by current 
terrorists and former terrorists of every ideological hue from every 
part of the world is the desire to exact revenge.  Sometimes this is 
revenge for something they or their family suffered, often it is 
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revenge for a wrong inflicted on the community with which they 
identify.184 
This was echoed in the Umarov’s words above about the Olympics.  
It is also seen in other statements, such as Shariat Jamaat’s repeated 
references to the state as the oppressor, to the torture of Dagestanis.  
The group stated, 
In response to murders and persecutions of Muslims, Dagestani 
Mujahideen are striking back and eliminating the butchers from 
punitive structures of the Makhachkala pro-Moscow regime. And at 
the same time they are trying to explain their actions to the 
population and call on the local authorities to give up the policies of 
tyranny and violence towards Muslims.185 
The aforementioned attacks are just the tip of the proverbial 
iceberg and more are likely to come.  In the wake of a bombing 
attack, a journalist observed, “In Dagestan, where male 
unemployment is estimated at around 80 percent, and polls show 
virtually no support for the Kremlin-installed local leaders, the 
outlook appears grim.”186   In sum, Moscow, Grozny and 
Makhachkala have failed to meaningfully address the contexts that 
have generated regional and local grievances.  Instead, wars have 
been waged, citizens demonized for their beliefs, lives destroyed, and 
the peoples’ hopes for a peaceful Dagestan, all but destroyed. 
III.  HUMAN RIGHTS AND WRONGS: FROM MOSCOW TO 
MAKHACHKALA 
Moscow’s failures to address the contextual factors of governance 
and militant violence, is interconnected with its unwillingness to 
meaningfully acknowledge that a peaceful Makhachkala is dependent 
on respect for human rights.  Pointedly, there is a profound 
disconnect between Russia’s obligations in this regard and the actual 
situation in Dagestan.  After the twin attacks on the Moscow subways 
and the killings in the republic, then-President Dmitry Medvedev 
stated, “The measures to fight terrorism should be expanded, they 
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should be more effective, more harsh, more cruel.”187  In March 2011, 
journalist Mark Franchetti, referring to state counterterrorism efforts 
in the North Caucasus, averred that “the Russians have responded 
with the ruthless tactics they honed during the last Chechen war. 
Suspected militants are often abducted, tortured and executed in 
‘extrajudicial” killings.’”188  As this section reveals, however, alleged 
militants are not the only ones victimized. 
In Moscow and the North Caucasus, there are scores of individuals 
on the literal and figurative front lines, reporting about government 
misconduct and spotlighting state abuses.189 Many have been 
subjected to threats and intimidation, some have been victims of 
violence and dozens have been murdered.190  A few of these cases 
have gained international attention.191  Violence targeting these 
individuals raises serious concerns about the Russian government, 
including direct state involvement; the failure to protect known or 
likely targets; and the insufficient investigation and prosecution of 
alleged perpetrators.  While the cases in Dagestan (let alone the 
North Caucasus) are too numerous to explore herein, a review of 
select incidents highlights a critical aspect of the conflict context, with 
sustained ramifications long after the last bullet is fired or bomb 
exploded. 
This section first explores Russia’s commitment to human rights, 
then examines targeted attacks, first on journalists, then on human 
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rights defenders.  These subparts emphasize events in Dagestan, but 
also take a wider angle to view the situation across Russia. 
A. Russia’s Rhetorical Commitment to Human Rights 
Russia’s rhetorical commitment to human rights looks quite good 
on paper, particularly at the international level, where it has ratified 
or acceded to a number of key treaties.  Included therein are the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the 
Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights or ECHR).192  While a plethora of 
violations are raised in the case studies below, there are several key 
rights around which abuses are centered: the right to life, freedom 
from arbitrary detention, freedom from torture and inhumane 
treatment, and freedom of opinion and expression. 
Article 6 of the ICCPR stipulates, “Every human being has the 
inherent right to life.  This right shall be protected by law.  No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”193  This is considered a 
foundational right.  Derogation is not permitted, even in times of 
emergency.194  The U.N. Human Rights Committee, which oversees 
implementation of the ICCPR, affirms that it is the “supreme right,” 
and it “should not be interpreted narrowly.”195  Moreover, states have 
a positive obligation to ensure the fulfillment of the rights contained 
therein and that a failure “to take appropriate measures or to exercise 
due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm 
caused by such acts by private persons or entities” could be construed 
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as a violation.196  Also at the U.N. level, there is a Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.197  In 2003, as per 
its mandate, the Special Rapporteur requested a country visit to 
Russia, with follow-up requests the subsequent two years.198  The 
ECHR, Article 2(l) also affirms the right to life, and provides for 
nonderogation (Article 15).199  Finally, Article 20 of the Russian 
constitution provides, “Everyone shall have the right to life.”200 
Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 3 of the ECHR prohibit 
torture.  There is a treaty specifically dedicated to protecting people 
from this most egregious of violations: the Convention against 
Torture and Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.201  This convention provides for a broad understanding 
of torture and ill treatment, and stipulates that states must take 
measures to prevent torture and hold those who so engage 
accountable.202  The Committee against Torture affirms its non-
derogable nature and states that special circumstances do not justify 
such treatment, including 
a state of war or threat thereof, internal political instability or any 
other public emergency. This includes any threat of terrorist acts or 
violent crime as well as armed conflict, international or non-
international.  The Committee is deeply concerned at and rejects 
absolutely any efforts by States to justify torture and ill-treatment as 
a means to protect public safety or avert emergencies in these and 
all other situations.203 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General 
Legal Obligations on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004). 
 197. See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions—
Introduction, OFFICE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). 
 198. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions—
Country Visits, OFFICE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/visits.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). 
 199. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 2, art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 200. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 20 
(Russ.). 
 201. See generally U.N. General Assembly, Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46 
(Dec. 10, 1984). 
 202. Id.  For the meaning of torture, see Article 1; for criminal jurisdiction and 
prosecution, see especially Articles 4–7; training and review of practices and 
procedures are addressed in Articles 10 and 11. 
 203. U.N. Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2., ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
no. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008). 
66 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
In their 2012 concluding comments, in response to Russia’s 
periodic report, the Committee was, “concerned at numerous, 
ongoing and consistent reports of serious human rights abuses 
inflicted by or at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence 
of public officials or other persons acting in official capacities in the 
northern Caucasus.”204  Beyond the treaty structure, there is also a 
Special Rapporteur on Torture, who has had a pending visit request 
to Russia, with regard to Chechnya, since 2000.205  Domestically, 
Article 21 of the Russian constitution prohibits “torture, violence, or 
other severe or humiliating treatment or punishment.”206 
The rights to “liberty and security of person” and the prohibition 
against “arbitrary arrest and detention,” are contained in Article 9 of 
the ICCPR.207  In 2009, the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed 
concern 
about ongoing reports of torture and ill-treatment, enforced 
disappearance, arbitrary arrest, extrajudicial killing and secret 
detention in . . . the North Caucasus committed by the military, 
security services and other State agents, and that the authors of such 
violations appear to enjoy widespread impunity due to a systematic 
lack of effective investigation and prosecution.208 
There is also a U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
which has lodged a request to visit Russia.209  The right to liberty and 
security of person is guaranteed under Article 5 of the European 
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Convention.210  Article 22 of the Russian constitution stipulates that 
detention exceeding forty-eight hours requires a court order.211 
Article 19 (2) of the ICCPR guarantees “freedom of expression,” 
which includes the freedom “to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing 
or in print.”212  The U.N. Human Rights Committee has noted, 
“Freedom of expression is a necessary condition for the realization of 
the principles of transparency and accountability that are, in turn, 
essential for the promotion and protection of human rights.”213  
Towards that end, it emphasizes the need for “[a] free, uncensored 
and unhindered press or other media.”214  This emphasis speaks to the 
interdependence of human rights, which is critical in understanding 
the size and complexity of the web of violations taking place in 
Dagestan.  In other words, if people are killed, tortured, or unjustly 
imprisoned by the state, this right helps ensure that their suffering 
and that of their families is not muted by the state.  It allows a 
spotlight to be shined on violators, who otherwise could operate 
under cover of political and legal darkness and with impunity.  A 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression 
emphasizes the importance of this right through country visits, 
reports, and the transmission of urgent appeals to states.215  Here too, 
a country visit has been requested of Russia.216  Article 10 of the 
European Convention also protects these rights.  Finally, Article 29 of 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Collection_Convention_1950_eng.pdf. 
 211. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 22 
(Russ.). 
 212. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 193, art. 
19(2), at 178. 
 213. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34—Article 19: 
Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, General Remarks, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See generally Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, OFFICE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
HUM. RTS., 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/OpinionIndex.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
 216. See Freedom of Opinion and Expression—Country Visits, OFFICE UN HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/Visits.aspx (last visited Oct. 
17, 2013). 
68 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
the Russian constitution requires a free media, exhorts freedom of 
opinion and expression and prohibits censorship.217 
These legal commitments notwithstanding, journalists and human 
rights defenders, along with their families and communities, have 
suffered because of state action and inaction.  State violence and a 
related accountability gap for crimes committed against them 
perpetuates local insecurity, fueling grievances and increasing the 
socio-political space between Moscow and Makhachkala, as well as 
between Makhachkala and Dagestan’s citizens. 
B. Silencing Truth: Targeting Journalists 
On July 9, 2013, Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev, the deputy editor 
of Novoye Delo, an independent newsweekly in Dagestan, was shot 
and killed in a suburb of Makhachkala.218  The Russian Investigative 
Committee for Dagestan said, “[T]he main version of the murder is 
related to his professional activities as a journalist.”219  
Akhmednabiyev reported on “extrajudicial kidnappings by local 
security forces, human rights violations during counterterrorism 
operations, and pressure against Muslim organizations.”220 For 
example, in June 2011, (harkening to the aforementioned governance 
issue), he wrote that corruption provided a context in which people 
more easily joined the militants, and that the Russian state used the 
North Caucasus as a national distraction to avoid dealing with other 
issues.221  His name had been on an anonymously authored hit list that 
surfaced several years ago.222  Those on this list were allegedly 
assisting militants and criminals and therefore responsible for the 
deaths of security officials.223  Human rights NGOs and others raised 
questions about the state’s failure to protect Akhmednabiyev, given 
the threats made (and the fact that a prior attempt had been made on 
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his life).224 For example, Reporters Without Borders stated, “In many 
attacks and murders, the local and federal authorities have 
unfortunately not always shown the necessary determination to put 
an end to violence against journalists.”225  In terms of consequences, 
the NGO Article 19 noted, “His killing compounds the already unsafe 
environment for journalists in Dagestan and will undoubtedly cause 
journalists to further self-censor.  The killing of Akhmednabiyev is 
the intentional silencing of one of the few voices speaking out about 
human rights violations in Dagestan.”226 
Just a little more than a year and a half prior, Ghadzhimurad 
Kamalov, who founded the Dagestani paper Chernovik (which 
covered similar, difficult topics such as corruption and enforced 
disappearances) was murdered.227  Kamalov was on the same hit list as 
Akhmednabiyev.  He was also killed in a hail of bullets in 
Makhachkala, in December 2011.228  Kamalov wrote, “People look at 
the way that the police and the FSB [security service] behave, and it’s 
easy to understand why a lot of them feel their sympathies are with 
the other side, with the insurgents.”229  Although the police started an 
investigation into his death, an editor of Chernovik predicted that 
investigative journalism would suffer as a result of Kamalov’s murder 
and that their “many appeals to Moscow have received no response. 
The federal security forces and authorities have shown no interest in 
solving the murders of journalists in Dagestan.”230 
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The targeting of journalists is not a recent phenomenon.  Another 
Novoye Delo reporter was gunned down in June of 2005.231  
Magomedzagid Varisov was a journalist and a political analyst.232  He 
had been threatened and believed he was followed prior to his 
murder.233  He also “had unsuccessfully sought help from the local 
police.”234  Varisov was said to be “very critical of the . . . 
opposition”235 and “extremely critical of the authorities.”236  He had 
accused the opposition of trying to destabilize Dagestan and of 
“stir[ring] up hatred between the Chechen and Dagestani 
communities,” to their own advantage.237  Shariat Jamaat reportedly 
claimed responsibility for his death.238  However, Reporters Without 
Borders called for an “immediate investigation to identify both 
perpetrators and instigators and bring them to justice.”239 
Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev, Ghadzhimurad Kamalov, and 
Magomedzagid Varisov are just three of the seventeen journalists 
who have been murdered in Dagestan.240  In 2013, The Moscow Times 
reported, “Dagestan is widely seen as the most dangerous part of 
Russia for journalists to work.”241 And it is situated in an equally 
hazardous environment, as Human Rights Watch asserts that “[t]he 
North Caucasus region is one of the most dangerous places for 
journalists in the world, and it is no wonder if law enforcement 
                                                                                                                 
 231. See Ivan Sukhov, Killed for Thoughts, RUSDATA DIALINE—RUSSIAN PRESS 
DIGEST, June 30, 2005, available at LexisNexis 
 232. Magomedzagid Varisov: Russia, 1 Killed, INT’L PRESS INST. (June 28, 2005), 
http://www.freemedia.at/index.php?id=248&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=88&cHash
=8e6cbdbe1a. 
 233. Magomedzagid Varisov, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (June 28, 2005), 
http://archives.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14467. 
 234. Ann Cooper, Violent Censorship, MOSCOW TIMES, July 7, 2005, available at 
2005 WLNR 10610537.  Note that Cooper was writing on behalf of the Center to 
Protect Journalists. 
 235. Agomedzagid Varisov, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, June 28, 2005, 
http://cpj.org/killed/2005/magomedzagid-varisov.php. 
 236. Press Rights Institute Condemns Killing of Dagestani Journalist, AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE ENGLISH WIRE, July 5, 2005, available at LexisNexis. 
 237. Reporters Without Borders, Islamist Group Claims Responsibility for 
Journalist’s Murder, IFEX, July 5, 2005, 
http://www.ifex.org/russia/2005/07/05/islamist_group_claims_responsibility/. 
 238. Djamaat Shariat: The Territory of Jihad Extends!, KAVKAZ CENTER (July 2, 
2005), http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2005/07/02/3918.shtml. 
 239. Magomedzagid Varisov, supra note 233. 
 240. Journalist Shot Dead in Russia’s Dagestan Province, REUTERS, July 9, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us-russia-dagestan-killing-
idUSBRE9680HQ20130709. 
 241. Yekaterina Kravtsova, Dagestani Journalist Gunned Down, MOSCOW TIMES, 
July 10, 2013, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mobile/article/482889.html. 
2013] FROM MOSCOW TO MAKHACHKALA 71 
authorities aren’t doing their job.”242 Notably, the risks are not 
restricted to the North Caucasus.  Since 1993, the Committee to 
Protect Journalists has catalogued the murder of nearly eighty 
journalists across Russia, many of them in urban centers: the 
aforementioned five in Makhachkala, eight in Grozny, and twenty-
three in Moscow.243  In 2006, The Irish Times published “Death List: 
Prominent Russian Journalists Who Have Been Murdered,” which 
was simply and tragically a catalogue of each journalist’s name, 
journalistic outlet, and date and manner of death.244  Journalists were 
kidnapped, beaten, stabbed, shot, and poisoned.245 
Perhaps the most infamous murder was that of Anna 
Politkovskaya, who reported for Novaya Gazeta.246  She had survived 
a poisoning in 2004, while en route to the Beslan siege, before she was 
shot in 2006.247  She was murdered as she returned home to her 
apartment building in Moscow.248  She was an outspoken and 
thoughtful critic of Russian government policies, particularly as they 
related to Chechnya and the North Caucasus.249  Years after her 
murder, Petros Garibyan, a state investigator into her death, said in 
an interview that “the person who ordered this pursued not only 
retaliation against Anna Politkovskaya for critical publications . . . he 
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[also] sought a demonstrative and resonant act aimed at intimidating 
all of you—journalists—as well as society and the authorities.”250 
All told, the number of murdered journalists is staggering, and they 
reveal only the tip of the proverbial iceberg, albeit its most lethal 
point.  Journalists have also been physically abused, verbally 
harangued and threatened, and news outlets have been censored and 
had their doors shuttered.251  In 2005, Ann Cooper, writing for the 
Center to Protect Journalists, stated, 
We seek justice in all of the cases of murdered journalists. The 
reason is compelling: Without justice, this alarming pattern of 
journalist murders is likely to continue, with terrible repercussions 
for the media and for the Russian public.  Without justice, self-
censorship intensifies, particularly in the broadcast media.  
Reporting on basic public issues is increasingly restricted, and the 
public is kept in the dark about corruption, crime and human rights 
abuses.252 
Sadly, little has changed in the intervening eight years as the 
vicious cycle of murder and impunity for the perpetrators, be they 
militants, criminals, or state-sanctioned killers, continues. 
C. Killing Hope: Human Rights Defenders in the Crosshairs 
Human rights defenders have also come under rhetorical and 
literal fire as they too have been threatened and killed.253  On January 
20, 2012, Omar Saidmagomedov, a Dagestani lawyer, was shot and 
killed along with Rasul Kurbanov, after police in Makhachkala 
stopped them.254  The police alleged that Kurbanov fired first.255  
Witnesses offer a different version of events, and human rights groups 
suggest the murder was a state killing because Saidmagomedov 
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sometimes defended those accused of militancy.256  His father, who 
prepared his son’s body for religious burial, stated, 
I counted 23 wounds from exploding bullets; they also made a 
control shot. And then I was summoned for interrogation as a 
witness; and they asked about the mosque that Omar visited. The 
problem of Dagestan is that when Moscow orders to take off a hat, 
Makhachkala readily takes off the hat together with the head.257 
Magomed Guchuchaliev, another Dagestani lawyer was killed in 
July 2013.258  His murder came swiftly on the heels of the 
Akhmednabiev killing.  Guchuchaliev headed his own law firm, 
members of which “have been receiving threats in connection with 
their professional activities, and have faced harassment by members 
of the authorities.”259  The firm has defended those accused of 
militancy, and its attorneys have appeared on the earlier mentioned 
hit list.260  The head of the local bar association has accused the 
authorities in his death. 261  He alleges the murder was a means of 
pressuring his surviving son to testify in a case against Makhachkala’s 
mayor, who fell out of favor with the Kremlin.262  In a submission to 
U.N. Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial killings and human rights 
defenders, the Observatory for Human Rights Defenders noted it “is 
also strongly concerned by the context of impunity in which these 
crimes have occurred.”263 
Sapiyat Mogomedova, a Dagestani lawyer, has faced charges she 
has termed as “trumped up.”264  The charges against her are said to be 
in retaliation for a complaint she filed against the police alleging the 
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police brutally beat her.265  Her case against the police was closed in 
December of 2011 but Mogomedova was not notified until three 
months later.266  An Amnesty International researcher stated, 
Russian authorities . . . must also ensure that lawyers are free to 
discharge their professional duties . . . . Lawyers will continue to 
confront the system, but they have to do so safe in the knowledge 
that they are not risking their lives or the lives of their relatives.  All 
past violations of lawyers’ rights must be investigated impartially 
and effectively.267 
Dagestani defenders are not likely holding their breath.  
Magomedova states, “To say that I am not afraid would be wrong.  
But it is a healthy sense of fear.  Fright can either mobilize or 
paralyze.  I dare to hope that it mobilizes my strength.”268 
Mothers of Dagestan for Human Rights (MDHR) is an 
organization that knows about mobilization and fear.269  MDHR was 
founded in 2007 by the mothers of the disappeared.270  In August 
2009, MDHR’s offices in Makhachkala burned to the ground.  
Reports differ as to the cause.  One account says authorities initially 
blamed an electrical malfunction, while another says “that gasoline 
had been poured in the office and set on fire.”271  The NGO’s 
chairperson said it was arson.272  She was concerned that authorities 
may have set the fire in retaliation for a complaint she lodged with the 
local prosecutor regarding “an attack on a Muslim shop.”273  The 
organization has regularly reported on those who have been 
kidnapped and disappeared, and also spoken out about other human 
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rights violations.274  For example, in the wake of a police raid in a local 
village, they reported residents had been tortured, and the population 
was a “scared, beaten and exhausted people.”275 
Violence against human rights defenders in Dagestan occurs on a 
larger Russian stage, where activists, advocates and lawyers have 
been repeatedly targeted and killed in the North Caucasus and 
beyond.  Chechen President Ramzan Kadryov called those who work 
for Memorial, one of the foremost Russian human rights 
organizations, “enemies of the people, enemies of the law and 
enemies of the state.”276 Kadyrov counted Natalia Estimorova 
amongst these enemies.  She worked for Memorial, and “was one of 
the leading human rights defenders in the North Caucasus.”277  
 Members of the European Parliament awarded her a medal for her 
work in 2005; they stated, “A large part of the Chechen society sees 
Natalia as an emblematic moral figure in the non-violent Chechen 
resistance . . . . Far from political passions, she is, above all, devoted 
to helping victims of violence.”278  In July of 2009, she was kidnapped 
near her home in Grozny (Chechnya), and her body was dumped in 
the neighboring republic of Ingushetia.279  Natalia Estemiorova had 
been shot multiple times.280  Speaking to another human rights 
advocate, who expressed concerns for her safety, she said, “There’s so 
much to do, so many people, how can I leave them?”281  So while 
activists and advocates struggle in Dagestan, they do not struggle 
alone. 
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D. The Deafening Silence of Those Who Suffer 
Profound consequences result from the targeting of journalists and 
defenders and an unwillingness to find their killers.  When journalists 
and human rights defenders are unable or unwilling to ask the 
difficult questions about possible state abuses—be they corruption, 
torture or murder, all of which connect to militant violence and the 
state’s response—the silence of those who suffer is deafening.  
Further exacerbation occurs when officials fail to respond to threats 
or adequately investigate murders, let alone when the officials 
allegedly commit those offenses.  Human Rights Watch notes, “The 
authorities indifference to the killings of journalists and 
whistleblowers perpetuates impunity and inspires new attacks.”282  It 
is also problematic when such violence often occurs in a capital city—
a center for law, policy, and information, as well as citizens.  
Makhachkala must do more to protect its residents, particularly those 
who have been specifically targeted because of their work exposing 
state violations of human rights.  Amnesty International offered the 
following analysis: 
The killing of Omar Saidmagomedov has had a chilling effect 
across the North Caucasus.  During meetings in republics as far 
apart as Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria, lawyers were referring 
to this case as a kind of warning they felt they had been sent by the 
authorities.  A further important signal to the professional legal 
community in the North Caucasus was the authorities’ response—
the lack of progress in examining the suspicious circumstances of 
this case and the evident resistance to investigate the law 
enforcement officials involved in connection with this killing.283 
IV.  FROM MOSCOW TO MAKHACHKALA: THE PEOPLE IN 
BETWEEN 
Dagestanis, and indeed many of those in the North Caucasus, are 
the people in between.  They are neither perceived of as Russian nor 
are they sovereign.  King and Menon concur in noting, “The pivotal 
question for the North Caucasus is its place within the Russian 
Federation.  So long as the Russian state relies on proxies, proconsuls, 
and raw power to ensure order, the region will revert to what it was in 
                                                                                                                 
 282. Russia: Journalist Killed—Authorities Ignored Threats, Attacks Against Him 
supra note 242. 
 283. AMNESTY INT’L, CONFRONTING THE CIRCLE OF INJUSTICE 41 (2013), available 
at 
http://www.amnesty.at/uploads/tx_amnesty/Confronting_circle_of_Injustice_FINAL.
pdf. 
2013] FROM MOSCOW TO MAKHACHKALA 77 
the tsarist era—a troublesome, exotic appendage.”284  And that is 
exactly what Moscow has done.  From Moscow to Makhachkala, the 
rhetoric and reality of dependence and independence has been used 
in different ways to court the people’s political affections. The 
courtship, however, has become an abusive one as the state and 
militants attack each other and those who would stand in their way. 
Those in Moscow with the power to create positive change have thus 
far failed.  Much of this failure appears to lie in an absence of context: 
of local governance and center-periphery relations; of the 
development of and distinctions between militant groups; and, of 
targeting those who defend human rights, whether journalist or 
lawyer. 
Context is critical because it provides the backdrop against which 
people may choose to build relationships—amongst each other and 
between the structures of state and society, to transform conflict away 
from violence and toward sustainable peace.285  Law is the foundation 
for many of these relationships and structures—it dictates, in theory, 
how citizens may treat each other and how they may be treated by the 
state.  It also impacts the position of a state on the international stage.  
There has been a profound disrespect for domestic and international 
law from Moscow to Makhachkala and both the people and the state 
have suffered.  Russia is failing to live up to its tremendous potential 
in part because it represses its citizens in the name of maintaining 
stability.  In reality, it is furthering insecurity and helping fuel 
violence.  Moreover, Russia’s violations of human rights have 
undermined, albeit in a limited way, its standing on the international 
stage.286  
This Article addresses just a fraction of the issues that Dagestan 
faces though a discussion of local and regional contexts.  Importantly, 
embedded in the context, contained in the statistics of unemployment 
and death tolls, are the people in between, ordinary Dagestanis who 
are suffering.  Meanwhile, the Sochi Olympics loom large and near, 
physically and temporally, as does the trial of a young man accused of 
bombing the Boston Marathon, some 5000 miles away.  As this 
chapter winds down, so too has news coverage of the brothers 
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Tsarnaev and Dagestan.  All the while, many on the international 
stage suffer from foreign policy whiplash, reeling from one 
international disaster to the next, as Dagestanis live and die in 
relative silence and obscurity, until the next crisis of violence or 
conscience redirects global attention.  More questions need to be 
asked if answers are to be found to the human rights emergency that 
plagues Dagestan.  Their humanity demands it, as does ours. 
